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Abstract. We review the EU’s actions over the euro’s lifetime; since its introduction thru to 
the populist uprising of the late 2010s. The euro was introduced on a wave of optimism 
throughout the EU, although based on a compromised monetary agreement. Essentially, 
underlining the crisis and movement from optimism to pessimism in the EU integration 
road. Thus, it is hard to analyse the euro without reviewing the theories influencing this 
road. Furthermore, we analyse the long and short-run market stability of the euro FX 
market using the variance bound model of (Fakhry & Richter, 2018). However, it is difficult 
to explain the market analysis without referencing behavioural finance. Thus we use key 
elements of behavioural finance, such as the opposite scale behaviours of greed and fear, to 
fully explain the timeline analysis of the euro FX market stability in both the long and short 
runs. At first glance, the result was unexpected due to the critical factor that the market was 
significantly volatile in the long run; despite conventional wisdom dictating that in the 
long-run, the financial markets are generally stable. One possible explanation is that the 
market participants are fearful of the long-run future of the Euro. 
Keywords. Behavioural Finance, EU Integration, Euro, Euro Crises, Long/Short Run, 
Market Stability. 
JEL. C58, D81, G01, G02, H77. 
 
1. Introduction 
s argued by (Schmitter, 2005), at the heart of the further and deeper 
integration of Europe lays a strong ideology which is to prevent 
conflicts between the major European countries, there is a need for 
a deep integration. The introduction of the euro and EMU in 1999 was 
regarded as a necessary step on this road, integrating the economies and 
financial markets under one currency and monetary policy. Conversely, on 
1st January 1999, the euro was first introduced into 11 countries, and as we 
will see in the next section, it was greeted with extreme optimism by many 
economists and academics. However, recent developments have caused a 
rise in the popularity of populist nationalism political movements, 
especially in the aftermath of the crises and economic downturns. Mainly 
due to the loss of a “national identity” and“economic constraints”. So, the key 
questions are: how did we go from optimism to pessimism in two decades? 
Additionally, what is the impact on the stability of the Euro FX market? 
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In this paper, we analyse the stability of the Euro FX Market in the short 
and long run to capture the impact of this movement from optimism to 
pessimism. We use the variance bound test of (Fakhry & Richter, 2018) to 
analyse the long and short-run stability of the Euro FX market from its 
introduction till 31st December 2019. We subdivide the observations 
according to three different periods of impact: the introductory, crises and 
populist movement. 
Our essential contribution to the literature on European integration is in 
our research and analysis of the long and short-run stability of the Euro FX 
market over three sub-periods. The sub-periods correspond to different 
episodes in the Euro timescale as the mood changes from optimism to 
pessimism. We follow (Fakhry & Richter, 2018) in using the C-GARCH 
model of (Engle & Lee, 1999) to model our variance bound test and analyse 
the volatility pattern. Furthermore, we combine behavioural and EU 
theories in explaining the movement from optimism to pessimism. 
Our findings seem to be hinting at a critical requirement of two 
fundamental theories to explain the timeframe of the euro: behavioural 
finance and EU integration. It is only by combining these two theories that 
one begins to capture the impact of the three main episodes in the 
timeframe of the euro on the FX market, and hence the market participants. 
Damningly, our analysis hint at long-run concerns based on underlying 
policy issues in the European integration. Moreover, the problems were 
known, since the interception of the EMU. Conversely, our test of the 
stability of the Euro FX market in the short and long runs illustrates that as 
the market moves from one episode to the next, the market become 
increasingly volatile in the long run. This movement seems to be 
correlating with the trends from optimism towards pessimism on the EMU 
and EU integration. A possible explanation is that market participants are 
increasingly fearful of the long term life of the euro.  
The structure of the paper follows the usual format in that the next 
section is the literature review. The following chapter is the methodology 
and data description. The last two parts are the empirical evidence and 
conclusion.  
 
2. Literature review 
A critical factor in the European integration process, as highlighted 
previously, is the elimination of the threat of war. As argued by 
(Rosamond, 2005), both (Haas, 1958) and (Hoffmann, 1966) extended the 
ideology of David Mitranythat international cooperation is the best way of 
preventing conflicts amongst different nation-states. It was this fear of 
another war and the underlying thinking of David Mitrany that were the 
driving forces behind what would eventually become the European Union. 
Furthermore, as stated by (Bekaert et al., 2013), from its inception in 1957, 
the EU has promoted the free movements of goods, services, capital and 
people. 
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Furthermore, the goal of the EU has always been complete economics 
and financial integration among its members. Conversely, as outlined by 
(Genschel & Jachtenfuchs, 2018), since the mid-1950s, EU policy has been 
market integration, which does not require political function integration. 
However, with the increasing market integration activities in the 1990s; 
there was added functional spillover pressures into monetary/fiscalpolicies. 
Moreover, as suggested by (Genschel & Jachtenfuchs, 2018), the member 
states refused to have these fundamental core state powers integrated 
under the European Union. Hence the European Union opted to regulation 
integration and horizontal differentiation. Furthermore, as argued by (Gali 
& Perotti, 2003), fiscal integration was regarded by many as an unnecessary 
and harmful “straitjacket” on national fiscal policies. Conversely, the 
EMUpolicies of monetary integrationcame into EU regulations with the 
Maastricht Treaty of 1992. 
The Maastricht Treaty did not come into effect until 1999 when the 
introduction of the euro and EMUcame into being. Both were launched to 
much fanfare by many academics and policymakers as highlighted by 
(Cohen, 2003), many predicted a rosy future for the new currency and some 
predicted the euro would eventually challenge the US dollar for global 
supremacy. (Gros & Thygesen, 1998, p.373) states that the euro will be a 
second global currency. Furthermore, (Mundell, 2000, p.57) was in no 
doubt that the euro would eventually challenge the US dollar. Moreover, 
according to (Bergsten, 1997) and (Alogoskoufis & Portes, 1997), the 
strength of the Eurozone’s economy and hence economic fundamentals 
means that the euro challenge was likely to be sooner. 
However, according to (Cohen, 2003), few, such as McCauley, (1997) and 
(Wyplosz, 1999) disagreed with the pace, not the trajectory of the euro’s 
challenge and optimism. Moreover, fewer still questioned the enthusiasms 
towards the euro at the time, such as Feldstein, (1997) and Calomiris, 
(1999). Feldstein, (1997) warns of the increased likelihood of conflicts 
between EU member states due to disagreements among the Eurozone 
memberstates with regards to the goals and methods of monetary policy. 
Thus, leading to economic disputes on several issues and hence distrust 
amongst some member states. 
Moreover, as Calomiris, (1999) argues there are two significant issues at 
the heart of the EMU agreement that could prevent the euro from 
challenging the US dollar. The first is the ability of any member state to 
exits the Eurozone, thus leading to the possibility of the threat of 
withdrawal being used to influence monetary policy. The second issue is a 
lack of credible plans to guard the euro against fiscal shocks in member 
states. Furthermore, according to (Cohen, 2003), significant obstacles were 
standing in the way of the euro: 
 The persistent inertia behaviour of monetary systems 
 The high costs of business 
 The “anti-growth” bias built into EMU 
 Ambiguous governance structure of EMU 
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Although as hinted by (Cohen, 2003), there is no reason why the EU may 
not overcome these obstacles. 
Nevertheless, during the early partsof the euro, there were many 
positives concerning the financial markets. According to (Danthine, 
Giavazzi & Von Thadden, 2000) and (Trichet, 2001), the euro had an 
immediate impact on the Eurozone financial markets. Furthermore, 
according to (Fratzscher, 2002) and (Baele et al., 2004),  the EMU is the main 
driving force for the increased integration in the Eurozone equity markets 
since 1996. As (Baele et al., 2004) states, there are three critical elements of 
the Eurozone financial market integration: 
 The advantages of sector diversification have surpassed those of 
country diversification.  
 Common news factors increasingly determine equity returns.  
 The decrease of home bias leading to an increasing diversification in 
financial portfolios.  
However, (Ehrmann & Fratzscher, 2002) found that US macroeconomics 
news continued to have a more considerable impact on Eurozone financial 
markets. Moreover, the effect of the euro was diverse across theEurozone 
financial markets spectrum, as (Galati & Tsatsaronis, 2003) notes. Indeed 
(Cappiello et al., 2006) found that in comparison with the bond market, the 
integration of the equity market was partial. Furthermore, according to 
(Bekaert et al., 2013), the increased financial integration was mainly due to 
EU Membership and not euro adoption. 
According to (Banducci, Karp & Loedel, 2009), the euro enjoyed majority 
support across the EU despite the significant inflationary pressures during 
the first ten years. The reasoning is a combination of positive effects on the 
EU and the strength of the new currency. Nevertheless, (Tsoukalis, 2011) 
hints at a shift during the second decade in the prospects of the euro. After 
a period of economic recession and financial crisis, many were questioning 
the monetary unionand EU. According to (Genschel & Jachtenfuchs, 2018) 
and (Jones, Kelemen & Meunier, 2016), the crises and economic recessions 
have highlighted the fundamental flaws in the original structure of the 
monetary union agreement. However, as European Commission president, 
Romano Prodi, prophesied in the Financial Times in December 2001: 
“I am sure the euro will oblige us to introduce a new set of economic 
policy instruments. It is politically impossible to propose that now. 
But some day there will be a crisis and new instruments will be 
created.” 
As illustrated by the comment, the EU knew these flaws since the 
interception of the EMU project. As argued by (Jones, Kelemen & Meunier, 
2016), the EMU project had three crucial factors for the success of the euro 
in the long term missing: 
 Fiscal Union 
 Macroeconomics adjustment policies 
 A unified banking regulation 
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According to (Jones, Kelemen & Meunier, 2016) then, the seeds to the 
crises were planted in the inadequate policies underpinning the EMU on its 
interception. Moreover, at the heart of this inadequacy was the lowest 
common denominator factor facilitated by the intergovernmental 
bargaining process as dictated by liberal intergovernmentalism.  
As hinted by (Genschel & Jachtenfuchs, 2018), at the heart of the 
neofunctionalism and liberal intergovernmentalism theories is a simple 
truth that integration is the efficient collective response to a common 
European problem. The problem is that the EMU was not genuinely 
efficient and collective as proved by the crises. In essence, the EMU project 
created as many problems as it solved. As listed by (Genschel & 
Jachtenfuchs, 2018), the EU has come up with some possible scenarios for 
the future path of integration: 
 “carry on”, this implies an ad-hoc problem-solving unreformed EU. 
Nevertheless, as recent events have proven, this is a risk riddled 
scenario.  
 Unwind back to the Single market integration policy, thus dropping 
all attempts at core-power integration and abandoning the EMU and 
Schengen projects. This scenario was unpredictable and had many 
unknown issues. Therefore it was deemedtoo costly, even for crisis-hit 
members such as Greece. 
 Increased horizontal differentiational integration whereby 
unwilling or unable member states opt or forced to opt-out of further 
integration of state core powers. This scenario contains no 
understanding of the solutions to existing problems. Moreover, it would 
need an increased willingness by the “able” to show a multilateral 
solidarity.  
 “doing less more efficiently”, this implies the EU focusing on a few 
essential functions and more importantly getting involved in the 
regulation of these functions. 
 Increase full integration for all member states. The fear is that this 
scenario may lead to a federal interpretation of theEU integration. 
Furthermore, As argued by (Jones, Kelemen & Meunier, 2016), the 
incomplete piecemeal approach to the crisis presented two intertwined 
puzzles. The first is that at the start of the Euro crises, the leaders 
acknowledged that such an approach would be inadequate. The second is 
the tendency for every step in this piecemeal approach to lead to further 
EU integration rather than disintegrate. As a result, “failing forward” by 
the constant policy of responding to failures of incremental reform of EU 
with new piecemeal reform for deeper integration. Providing answers to 
this intertwined puzzle means analysing both the intergovernmentalism 
and neofunctionalism approaches. The key argument here is that each 
school addresses a specific issue within this puzzle; intergovernmentalism 
captures the dynamism within the critical junctures, whereas 
neofunctionalism defines the mechanism underpinning links between one 
critical juncture and the next. The fusion of these two schools would 
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present acomplete picture of the EU’s response to the Eurozone crisis, thus 
explaining the fail forward pattern in EU integration. 
As defined by (Schimmelfennig, 2017), a crisis in European integration is 
a situation whereby the decision-making process couldmanifest into a 
threat leading to a significant probability of disintegration. A disintegration 
is the reduction of the current level, scope and membership of integration. 
Simply put, an integration crisis is one which could threaten the extent of 
pooling and delegation, EU policy competences or member states exiting. 
This definition was at the heart of the crises within the EU during the last 
few years. Furthermore, crises are open-ended events that may disintegrate 
the EU, the reassertion of the status quo or further integration. Thus, 
capturing the essence of a decision-based crisis cycle: spill-back, 
encapsulation and spillover leading to positive, negative or stable changes 
in the integration process.    
According to (Schimmelfennig, 2017), in its most general 
conceptualisation an explanation of a crisis in the EU integration process 
generates a deviated response from all three prevailing theories of EU 
integration. As illustrated by Table 1, there are varied differences in all 
categories of an integrated crisis which highlights the underlining 
assumptions of each theory. These differences range from the explanation 
of the crisis to the eventual outcome. Depending on the theory, the result 
could be disintegration or further integration. In summarising, the three 
theories do agree with the importance of the crises to the catalyst of 
theoretical and observational changes in European integration. However, 
they disagree with the source, processes and effects of the crises on the 
integration process. 
 
Table 1. Integration Theories General Explanation of Crises 







Endogenous & domestic: 
euro-scepticism 
Crisis mechanism  Bargaining Path-dependency Politicisation 







autonomy and capacity 
Insulation 





 Source: Schimmelfennig, (2017). 
 
Thus, highlighting the three separations in the explanation of the EU 
integration process during the crises. Firstly, the intergovernmentalism 
account for the euro crises. As suggested by (Hooghe & Marks, 2019), the 
euro crises had several features which could be explained by 
intergovernmentalism. The threat to the existence of the Eurozone was 
significant and immediate. 
Moreover, the EU did not have the financial resources and legality to 
intervene as the lender of last resort. Hence the solution was in the 
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intergovernmental bargaining between the member states. Thus, resulting 
in a “chicken game” characterised by hard intergovernmental bargaining 
and brinksmanship between the northern rich nations and southern crisis-
ridden nations. The threat of the crisis to the existent of the Eurozone 
ensured a lengthy and iterated intergovernmental negotiation characterised 
by substantial interdependence and sharp asymmetries. The resulting 
series of lowest-common-denominator deals constrained by the diverged 
preferences on the distribution of costs did just enough to avert the 
dissolution of the Eurozone. Conversely, minimising the immediate 
expense to the northern states in the dominant bargaining position. 
As hinted by (Hooghe & Marks, 2019), the long-term perspective was 
explained by the neofunctionalism approach. The severity of the euro crises 
was mainly due to the “half baked” functionality of economic and monetary 
integration introduced by the Maastricht Treaty. Neofunctionalism dictates 
that when the euro crises hit, path dependency meant that member states 
were primarily concerned with saving the Euro generating intense 
pressures to fixing the flaws. Initially, the agreements were to introduce 
several institutions under the direct influence of member states; 
subsequence agreements nudged these institutions towards control by the 
EU. The ECB also obtained more powers to act as like any central bank to 
supply money and buy assets thru QE and outright monetary transactions 
policies. Hence, the crisis was the result of an unintended spillover and 
concluded with enhanced supranationalism.  
And finally, the postfunctionalism account. According to (Hooghe & 
Marks, 2019) in contrast, postfunctionalism perceived the response by the 
EU to the euro crises as a result of domestic politics and, particularly, the 
rise of nationalist opposed to European integration. Thisissue was central 
to the lack of a quick, cohesive and strategic response; therefore resulting in 
the spiral of the crisis. Moreover, the domestic politics during the crisis 
meant a resistance to supranational solutions. Furthermore, northern 
governments were reluctant to heed advice to ditch their “me first” policies 
of economic growth fearing public opinion. This combination of fear and 
greedundermined the response of the EU nearly led to the collapse of the 
Eurozone. A further complication, according to postfunctionalism, was the 
politicisation of the crisis. Thus, leading to a narrowing of reform options in 
the wake of the crisis. This procrastination meant that instead of the 
urgently required reform of the Eurozone, a cocktail of monetary policy, 
bailouts and tightening regulations was the result. Moreover, the price paid 
by all sides was high. 
However, the impact on the euro was small, to explain the limited 
impact,  we need to understand the psychology of the market participants. 
A fundamentalexplanationof the lack of any effect on the euro is the euro 
heuristic, as derived by (Szyszka, 2013). The euro heuristics is the tendency 
of market participants to put all Eurozone states under the same label. 
Another factor is the belief by many that the euro was safe because both 
sides were not willing to abandon it. As stated by (Moravcsik & 
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Schimmelfennig, 2012), the risk of catastrophe would unite all parties of the 
EU to avoid the immediate costs of default. For the southern countries at 
risk from high debt, there were high external and internal macroeconomic 
risks associated with leaving the euro. For the more prosperous countries 
of the north, the breakup of the euro would have meant currency 
appreciation and thus loss of trade. 
Nevertheless, the popular resistance to further EU integration, as 
highlighted by severalrecent events, has the potential to impact on the 
Euro. As highlighted by (Schimmelfennig, 2018), according to 
postfunctionalism differentiated integration and disintegration are 
attributed to a politicisation process. This process points to a shift in 
European integration issues from interest groups to the masses where 
political identity plays a more significant role. Here are several factors 
driving the politicisation process: 
 the depth of integration 
 exclusive national identity 
 Euroscepticism  
 referendums 
According to (Schimmelfennig, 2018), the demand for disintegration 
centre around the three hypotheses based on the last three factors: 
 The spillover of integration into identity-relevant areas. 
 A big issue is the increaseinEurosceptic political parties within the 
member states. 
 The increase availability or use of EU integration referendums. 
The European Parliament election of 2014 and Brexit werethe catalyst for 
the demands for a partial or full disintegration. Underpinned by nationalist 
populism tendencies which are deviated towards euro scepticism as hinted 
by (Fligstein, Polyakova & Sandholtz, 2012),(Guiso et al., 2019),(Luo, 2017), 
(Polyakova & Fligstein, 2016) and (Tsarouhas, 2019). The increasing 
popularity of political parties such as National Rally in France is a threat to 
further EU and Eurozone integration. Furthermore, as hinted by (Fakhry, 
2019b) since the Franco-German axis is the driving force behind European 
integration, the substantial rise of National Rally could present some 
difficulties to further Eurozone and EU integrations. However, many like 
(Mudde, 2016) disagree with the significance of both the 2014 European 
Parliament election and Brexit. Moreover, the problematic and long 
winding Brexit negotiations should act as a repellent against any thoughts 
of disintegration, especially for the eurozone members. 
 
3. Methodology 
Since as stated by (Pastor & Stambaugh, 2012), conventional wisdom 
dictates that there is a difference between long and short runs in 
economicsand, more specifically, the financial markets. Moreover, (Engle & 
Lee, 1999) hints that volatility has a more rapid mean reversion in the short 
run than in the long run. Also, (De Bondt, 2000) indicates that the price 
reverts to the fundamental price in the long run. Effectively what (De 
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Bondt, 2000), (Engle & Lee, 1999) and (Pastor & Stambaugh, 2012) are 
indicating is market participants' reactions tend to deviate overtime. Thus, 
meaning that markets are generally less volatile and reactive in the long 
run due mainly to being less perspective to shocks and hence are more 
stable.  
In analysing the stability of the Eurozone financial markets in the long 
and short run in the aftermath of the introduction of the Euro, we used the 
methodology of  (Fakhry & Richter, 2018). Like  (Fakhry, 2019a), we use the 
asymmetrical C-GARCH-m model of (Engle & Lee, 1999) as the model of 
volatility underpinning our stability test in the long and short run. As with 
(Fakhry & Richter, 2018) and (Fakhry, 2019a), we adhere to the two pre-
requisite steps advocated by (Shiller, 1979) and (Shiller, 1981): calculate the 
5-day variance and estimate the residuals as in Equation 1 and Equation 2. 
 
𝑙𝑖𝑚𝑡→𝑇 𝑣𝑎𝑟 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑡 =




       (1) 
𝑣𝑎𝑟 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑡 = 𝑎 + 𝑏. 𝑣𝑎𝑟 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑡−1 + 𝜇𝑡 , 𝜇𝑡 = Τ𝜇𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑡     (2) 
 
Since we follow the methodology of (Fakhry, 2019a) by including the 
feedback effect, we are thus using the GARCH-m model of (Engle, Lilien & 
Robins, 1987) as the mean equation illustrated in Equation 3. The key to 
interpreting the feedback effect is the λ coefficient in equation Equation 3. 
Thus, a significantly positive λ coefficient hints at a positive feedback effect 
and suggests that as risk increases, the return should increase as well. 
However, in contrast, a significantly negative λ coefficient means as risks 
increases, the returns should decrease. 
 
𝑣𝑎𝑟 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑡 = 𝜆ℎ𝑡−1 + 𝑎 + 𝑏. 𝑣𝑎𝑟 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑡−1 + 𝜇𝑡     (3) 
 
We estimate a first-order asymmetrical C-GARCH-m (1, 1) model to 
obtain the long and short-run volatility using Equation 3. As derived by 
(Engle & Lee, 1999), the asymmetrical C-GARCH model is as illustrated in 
Equation 4 and Equation 5. Equation 4 is the long-run volatility, and 
Equation 5 is the short-run volatility. The critical interpretation of the 
volatility model and the calculation of the stability status is in the 
coefficients of Equation 4 and Equation 5. Since as illustrated by (Engle & 
Patton, 2001), in the short-run, the  and  coefficients represent the market 
shocks (or news) and persistent respectively in Equation 5; thus in the long-
run, we can deduce that  and  represent the market shock (or news)  and 
persistent respectively. γ is the asymmetrical effect whereby if γ is >0, then 
there is a leverage effect meaning that negative shocks have a more 
significant impact than positive shocks. 
 
𝑚𝑡 = 𝜔 + 𝜌𝑚𝑡−1 + 𝜑 𝑘𝑡−1 − ℎ𝑡−1        (4) 
 ℎ𝑡 − 𝑚𝑡 = 𝜎
2 +  𝛼𝑘𝑡−1 − 𝑚𝑡−1 +  𝛽ℎ𝑡−1 − 𝑚𝑡−1 + 𝛾 𝑘𝑡−1 − 𝑚𝑡−1 𝐼  (5) 
where 𝐼 =  
0, 𝜀 ≥ 0
1, 𝜀 < 0
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As stated by (Fakhry, 2019a), the coefficients of both equations are 
required to calculate the stability statistics in our variance bound test. We 
derive our stability test by using the f-statistics, which for our observed 
data samples at the 5% level is 1.96, which means that our short and long-
run stability statuses are Equation 6 and Equation 7 as derived by (Fakhry, 
2019a). As in (Fakhry, 2019a), the conditions in Equation 6 and Equation 7 
mean that the markets are stable and therefore have the potential to be 




𝑠𝑑𝑒𝑣  𝑣𝑎𝑟  𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒   
≤ 𝐹𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡      (6) 
𝑆𝑆𝐿𝑅 =
 𝜑+𝜌 −1
𝑠𝑑𝑒𝑣  𝑣𝑎𝑟  𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒   
≤ 𝐹𝑆𝑡𝑎𝑡       (7) 
 
4. Data description 
As stated earlier, this paper analyses the stability of the eurozone 
financial markets during three different periods (Euro introductory and 
enthusiastic period, crises period, and the rise of nationalistic tendencies 
period). Hence, we observe the Euro FX market to determines the stability 
of the market. We use the nominal broad effective exchange rate obtained 
from the Bank for International Settlement as our observed Euro FX index 
dataset. Our data consist of daily market observations on a 5-day week 
basis between 1st January 1999 and 31st December 2019, filling the missing 
data with the last previously known data. Thus, giving us a total of 5,478 
observations. 
 
5. Empirical evidence 
This research is essentially an analysis of the long/short-run behaviour 
of the FX market over the three critical periods in the lifetime of the euro. 
Hence, in this section, we will analyse the stability and reaction of the Euro 
FX Index during three observed periods: 
 The Introductory period observed from 1st January 1999 to 7th June 
2007 
 The Crises period observed from 8th June 2007 to 23rd May 2014 
 Populist era observed from 24th May 2014 to 31st December 2019 
In estimating the models, we used the Marquandt estimation method 
and normal distribution for all except the last period where used GED 
distribution. Crucially, the system environment may influence the 
estimation: our system is running EViews 11 on a Windows 10 
Procomputer with a ten cores CPU and 32 Gigabytes RAM. 
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Figure 1. Euro FX Index Price/Volatility 
Introductory period (1st January 1999 – 7th June 2007) 
 
As illustrated by Table 2, the stability statistic during the introductory 
period point to a stable Euro FX market in the long run; nevertheless, in the 
short-run, the statistic point to a volatile market. This market status is to be 
expected, since as stated by (Pastor & Stambaugh, 2012), conventional 
wisdom dictates there is a difference between the short and long runs. 
Generally, markets are more volatile in the short run than the long run due 
to being more perceptive to shocks. In other words, the Euro FX market 
was acting according to the standard model of stability. For an explanation, 
we should look no further than the impact on the behaviour of market 
participants due to the high esteem held on the euro.  
 














00 02 04 06 08 10 12 14 16 18
Introductory Period Crises Period Populist Period





















R2 0.976249 0.989023 0.974515
Log Likelihood 9002.11 7559.88 6309.92
DW-Statistics 1.757622 1.719615 1.709137
ARCH effect 0.607483 1.861465 0.00193
Jarque-Bera 1.31E+03 2.22E+03 1.45E+03
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The euro came into being on the back of some over-enthusiasm reaction. 
Thus as illustrated by Figure 1; during the initial stage of the introduction, 
the euro was highly volatile. This over-enthusiasm led to the euro being 
initially over-priced, which meant there were some intense downward 
pressures on the price. However, by early 2001, the euro was beginning to 
establish itself as a primary global currency and stabilising force in the 
European integrative process. The European Union economies, more 
specifically the Eurozone, were on an upwards trends which reflected on 
the euro. It seems the criticisms directed at the underlining EMU policy 
were not an issue. However, on closer inspection, the economic situation 
underpinning the strength of the euro was somehow weaker than first sight 
would suggest as illustrated by the collection of economic graphs in Figure 
1. Remember the Stability & Growth Pact underpinning the European 
Monetary Union set the limit at 60% and 3% for the debt and deficit to GDP 
ratios. Although, neither the ECB nor the EU seems to have GDP growth 
and unemployment rate targets, yet the majority of the 12 original 
Eurozone members had a higher unemployment than the US target of 5.5%. 
What is astonishing is the Greek statistics, yet the banks continued to buy 
the Greek debt.   
A long bull market and economic upturn in the global economy was at 
the forefront of this period. At the heart of this long period of economic 
boom was the housing market bubble induced by low interestrates and 
high leverage. Although the headline housing market bubble was mainly in 
the US; however, there was evidence across the Eurozone of a housing 
market bubble. The bubble was subsidised by the securitisation of 
mortgages in highly complex mortgage-backed securities and collateralised 
debt obligations offering high rates of returns. These securitised financial 
assets offered high yields on investments; however, they were highly risky 
and complicated financial assets as argued by (Barberis, 2013), 
(Brunnermeier, 2009) and (Masood, 2009) amongst others. Although, most 
people would agree that the US securitisation market was instrumental in 
the bubble;  yet, European securitisation markets were also partly 
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Figure 1. Key Economic Statistical Data in 2007 (source Eurostat) 
 
One possible explanation for the market participants’ reaction is found 
in the “Euro Heuristic” as derived by (Szyszka, 2013), which dictated that 
market participants tended to simplify by putting all the Eurozone financial 
assets in the same boat marked euro. This scenario included the adoption of 
sovereign debt from the GIIPS group of nations as safe-haven assets 
required by the Basel II regulation; in addition to risky financial assets from 
the periphery Eurozone member states, such as the securitised MBS or 
CDO from the GIIPS nations. 
According to (Barberis, 2013) and (Szyszka, 2013), an underlying issue 
was that market participants were extrapolating into the future with both 
sovereign debt and securitised assets markets. In the case of the securitised 
assets, they were extrapolating the rise of house prices too far into the 
future as identified by (Barberis, 2013). However, with the sovereign debts; 
they were extrapolating the continuation of the economic upturn as 
signified by (Szyszka, 2013). The markets were enjoying the honeymoon 
period of the Euro and EMU, failing to see the strategic consequences of the 
EMU and hence associated risks. This false sense of confidence in the 
economy and financial markets created by the integrative process of EMU 
and euro created a bubbled and overleveraged economy.  
As portrayed by (Szyszka, 2010), at the heart of this period of economic 
boom and bubbled financial market was the fear/hope (greed) conundrum2.  
As explained by (Lopes, 1987) and (Shefrin & Statman, 2000), there are two 
emotions dictating risk management, namely fear and hope(greed). While 
fear is determined by the overweighing of the worst-case scenario 
probabilities, greed is determined by the overweighing of the best-case 
scenario probabilities. Simply put, greed makes market participants unduly 
optimistic on investment opportunities; while fear makesmarket 
participants increasingly pessimistic. In short, market participants were 
showing signs of greed due to their excessive optimism towards the euro.  
This greed gave rise to a housing market and securitisation assets bubble 
in some eurozone member states, particularly Spain. The influencing factor 
behind this bubble is the ever-increasing rate of returns required by market 
 
2(Szyszka, 2010) refers to greed and fear but (Shefrin & Statman, 2000) and (Lopes, 1987) 
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participants during a period of long-lasting boom in the global financial 
market. Furthermore, the low cost of finance meant market participants 
were able to leverage at high levels just to increase the returns on 
investment. Policymakers underestimationof the significance of the 
developing bubble and the euro heuristic certainly helped inflame these 
two factors, as hinted by (Szyszka, 2010). The high rates of returns and low 
costs of finance during a booming economy meant that market participants 
became increasingly greedy and demanding, 
There is a further explanation of there was a need for European market 
participants to invest in these financial assets, due to the enormous 
earnings made by their US counterparts. Thus inducing peer group 
pressure and leading to envy as highlighted by (Hodgson, 2013). Moreover, 
as noted by (Alchian, 1950) and (Friedman, 1953), the sole existence of a 
publicly listed company is to maximise the shareholders' wealth. Hence, 
many European financial institutions were under pressure to increase 
earnings and thus maximise the shareholderswealth.   
In essence, as noted by (Barberis, 2013), thru the use of the belief 
manipulation hypothesis; market participants were able to delude 
themselves into thinking that their model was in the best interest of the 
organisation and thus the shareholders’ wealth. The belief manipulation 
hypothesis dictates that market participants affected by cognitive 
dissonance will attempt to manipulate their mindsets into thinking they are 
acting for the good of all involved. A key behavioural component in the 
belief manipulation hypothesis is the representative heuristic dictating that 
since the pricesof the underlining assets; in this case, the houses, were 
likely to continue rising; hence these securitised assets were expected to 
continue to be low risk. Another representative heuristic is that the 
economy of the Eurozone was expected to continue getting more robust 
based on the strength of the euro. Therefore investing in the sovereign debt 
of many periphery member states was risk-free and hence could be 
regarded as tier 1 capital under the Basel II regulations. 
 
5.1. The Eurozone Crises (8th June 2007 – 23rd May 2014) 
 
Table 2. is pointing at a volatile Euro FX market during the crisis period, 
and the critical factor is that it is not limited to the short-run. The long-run 
is also volatile, thus going against the conventional wisdom as dictated by 
(Pastor & Stambaugh, 2012). Therefore, highlighting the depth and extreme 
uncertainty of the crises. In essence, this period was the combination of 
three critical factors into a perfect storm; which left many people 
questioning the European integrative process and the EMU. However, as 
(Dabrowski, 2010) illustrates the continuation of the euro optimism; when 
added to the initial rebuttal of the financial crises as merely an American 
issue, meant that market participants continued to believe in the euro. 
Furthermore, the European response when it finally did arrive was late and 
uncoordinated. To understand the impact of this EU and euro FX market 
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uncertainty on the market participants, we need to understand the 
reactions of the market participants towards the volatile financial markets 
and confusion at the heart of the EU.  
By the end of 2005/early 2006, the housing market bubble burst, and 
subprime defaults rose. Nevertheless, as subprime defaults rose, the 
securitisation of the subprime loans was continuing; eventually leading to 
the global financial crisis. As noted by (Barberis, 2013), a surprising feature 
of the crisis was the dramatic decline of many risky assets of various types. 
Given the relatively small size of the subprime loan, the widespread and 
dramatic nature of the falls in prices of risky assets did, to say the least, 
take most people by surprise. Moreover, the speed at which the crisis 
spread globally suddenly bought into context the integrative nature of the 
financial market. 
A key statistic in explaining this issue is the total write-down, which as 
of April 2009 stood at $1.109 trillion in European banks3 as reported by the 
IMF4 . Thecriticalpoint is that nobody knew the full extent of the total 
number of subprime-related assets; hence the shareholders were 
extrapolating across the banking sector and therefore making them fearful 
of the global banking sector. 
As (Szyszka, 2010) suggests and hinted earlier, fear and hope (greed) 
have opposite attractions on the behaviour of market participants and 
generally on the trends in the markets. Hence, it comes as no surprise that 
when the global financial crisis hit; market participants’ fear levels rose 
quickly. Furthermore, an ever-increasing level of fear inevitably leads to 
panic, which intensifies the depreciation of assets. Thus, increasing the 
inflow of investments in safe-haven markets such as particular sovereign 
debt and commodities markets, more specifically the high graded 
sovereign bonds and gold markets. During the global financial crises, as 
market participants grew ever anxious concerning the securitised subprime 
loans market; as highlighted earlier, they became increasingly worried 
about the extent of the global financial sector’s holding of these “bad” 
assets. Hence fear increased and spread to the global financial sector as 
observed by panic runs on the global banking sector terminating in the 
bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers, an investment bank at the heart of the 
securitised subprime loans, among other major global financial institutions. 
There are two further conceptualisations of fear that could exuberate a 
crisis: 
 The policy effect dictates the action or inaction of policymakers has 
the potential of hiking fear among market participants. This issue is key 
to the lengthening of the crisis, the indecision or incorrect actions by the 
central banks and government had a negative impact. In the aftermath 
of the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy, central banks and governments 
across the globe were forced into action by events. 
 
3 Excluding the UK banks 
4 IMF Global Financial Stability Report, April 2009. 
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 The spillover effect or liquidity spiral see Figure 2, which dictates 
that if a financial institution has troubles selling a “bad” asset, then it 
may try to sell a “good” asset. Hence, overflooding the market; thus,  
decreasing the price and turning the “good” asset into a “bad” asset. 
This situation occurred during the global financial crisis. 
 
 
Figure 2. The Liquidity Spiral, source: (Brunnermeier, 2009). 
 
As (Barberis, 2013) hints, a possible explanation is the amplification 
mechanism. During the crisis, the amplification mechanism dictated that 
any market participant facing a loss in the value of subprime backed 
securities tended to sell other risky assets. Thus, pushing down the prices 
of the other risky assets forcing them to sell their other less risky assets, 
thereby ensuring a loss or margin spiral. This behaviour is fundamental to 
the explanation of the global spread of the crisis, particularly in our case to 
Europe.  
However, as noted by (Barberis, 2013), the loss aversion and ambiguity 
aversion related amplification mechanisms may also have played a vital 
role in the global financial crisis. Ambiguity aversion dictates that in 
situations where participants are unable to assign probabilities to future 
trends, they become increasingly averse. An extension to the ambiguity 
aversion is the competence hypothesis as presented by (Heath & Tversky, 
1991). The competence hypothesis dictates that the level of competence at 
analysing the situation determines whether the person is ambiguity averse 
or seeking. This hypothesis partly explains the global financial crisis; the 
explanation maintains that the initial loss on the subprime backed 
securities made investors less competent in analysing risky assets. They 
were thereby increasing ambiguity aversion, leading to a reduction in their 
holding of risky assets, therefore further reducing the price of these assets. 
According to (Barberis, 2013), the second fundamental explanation is the 
loss aversion theory of (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). This obverse that 
losses are more sensitive to market participants than profits of similar 
magnitudes. The less obvious observation is that the degree of aversion 
may vary with time, depending on the trend of losses or gains. Put simply 
this means any recent loss increases loss version making them less willing 
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to take risks that they would have taken otherwise. In terms of the global 
financial crisis, the initial decline in the price of subprime securities made 
market participants loss averse; thus, selling the risky assets on their books, 
further reducing the prices and hence increasing loss aversion. Both the 
ambiguity and loss aversions played a big part in the amplification 
mechanism during the global financial crisis and arguably in turning the 
crisis from a local to a global event.  
 
 
Figure 3. Greek vs German Sovereign Debt Index Prices  
Source: S&P Dow Jones Indices 
 
A vital element of the global financial crisis was the continuation of the 
euro heuristic and horizontal extrapolation, which meant that market 
participants ignored the weak macroeconomics indicators of the periphery 
Eurozone member states. This ignorance led to continued high credit rating 
and investment in the sovereign debt of the GIPS nations as safe havens 
throughout the global financial crisis.  
As stated by (Szyszka, 2013), a puzzling factor in the euro crises is the 
somewhat belated action of the European banks in reassessing the Greek 
sovereign debts on their balance sheet. As illustrated by Figure 3, as late as 
5th April 2010, the Greek sovereign debt was priced higher than the 
German. The Greek crisis started with the announcement of the upwards 
amendment of the fiscal deficit in 5th November 2009; the banks did not 
react by amending their financial statements until late 2010-early 2011. 
Why did it take that long to reassess the risk on their balance sheet? In 
truth, bad news travels slowly, simply put it is hard to accept bad news. 
Theoretically, market participants tend to deploy over-optimism or wishful 
thinking in the belief that positive results can still be possible. Hence, as 
stated by (Barberis & Thaler, 2003), cognitive conservatism underweights 
any new information contradicting an earlier positive view. Moreover, 
since market participants are by nature loss avert, therefore mentally, they 
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(Kahneman & Tversky, 1979), market participants may take higher risks to 
avoid or postpone loss.  
As identified by (Szyszka, 2013), the influence of external players, such 
as hedge funds and rating agencies, during the euro crises, cannot be 
underestimated. Among the strategies hedge funds use are short-selling 
and hedging by buying derivatives such as CDS. Simply put short selling is 
a strategy whereby the hedge fund bets on the price of an asset falling, as 
illustrated by Figure 4. Another strategy often used by hedge funds is 
hedging against a country or organisation by buying a derivative, often 
Credit Default Swap, against the possibility of a default. EU and national 
politicians blamed these two strategies during the euro crises for 
intensifying the crisis. A key behavioural factor underpinning these hedge 
funds strategies is herding, essentially herding is where market 
participants react to information or event in a similar way. The hedge funds 
often used this strategy during the euro crises whereby they would bet on a 
fall in euro against the dollar and Greek default.  
 
 
Figure 4. Short-selling strategy 
 
As indicated by (Szyszka, 2013), the second relevant players during the 
euro crises were the rating agencies who were implicated for the global 
financial crisis as highlighted by (Barberis, 2013). During the euro crises, it 
was a case of belated action followed by a quick reaction. The failure to 
recognise the risk disparity among the EU members gave rise to countries 
with weak macroeconomics factors being given the same triple-A rating as 
Germany, essentially Spain and Ireland. Furthermore, the continuation of 
Greek sovereign debt ratings as investment grade even though 
macroeconomic factors pointed towards a downgrading was instrumental 
in the continued investment by market participants. Additionally, the 
credit rating agencies only acted long after the markets classed the Greek 
yields as junk. Nevertheless, the rating agencies overreacted in the 
downgrading of the Portuguese and Irish sovereign debts, even though 
both countries have agreed to undertake IMF restructuring programs and 
their economies were in better health than the Greek. 
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5.2. The Rise of Populism and Nationalism (24th May 2014 – 31st 
December 2019)  
The stability statistics in  
Table 2. illustrate the volatile euro FX market during this period of rising 
populism and nationalism policies among the EU member states. The 
surprising factor is the long-run stability statistic given, as highlighted 
previously, conventional wisdom dictates that in the long-run, the market 
is generally more stable than the short-run. Thus, a stability statistic for the 
long-run that is significantly greater than in the short-run indicates the 
highly volatile events during this period. A point worthy of mentioning is 
that several voices within the Eurozone and EU nation-states were calling 
for the disbandment of the Eurozone and EMU policy. There were two 
events which highlighted the uncertainty existing within the Eurozone 
during this period: the 2014 European parliament elections and 2016 Brexit 
referendum.  
At the heart of the surge in support for the populist and nationalist 
policies was the dissatisfaction in the economic reality and loss of national 
identity. However, the problem was that there no previous precedent for 
an unwinding of a monetary union. As pointed by (Ellsberg, 1961), any 
situation where the quality and confidence levels of the information is 
unknown leads to market participants becoming increasingly averse to 
ambiguity. Hence, the results of the 2014 European parliament and 2016 
Brexit referendum were a shock to the EU system, which many did not 
foresee. A related issue was the availability bias; due to lack of information 
to relate, market participants linked these events to the euro crisis.  
At the heart of the market participants’ fear of these events lays a simple 
truth that humans fear any social signals as hinted by (Zweig, 2010). Thus, 
meaning any media communication affecting the financial market in any 
way leads to a reaction from the market participants. Since, there was mix 
news and political communication about these events and the process, 
market participants’ perceptions were negative. Another critical factor is 
that the whole these events were emotionally charged, which triggered a 
snowball effect into the financial market, causing a loss of confidence as 
suggested by (Zweig, 2010). 
Moreover, as observed previously, market participants tend to 
extrapolate events into the future. During this period, notably the Brexit 
process, there was an element of vertical extrapolation in the analysis of the 
economic consequences of the Eurozone collapse. This trait was due in no 
small part to the ambiguity by the politicians at the heart of these events. 
Also, during the Brexit process, there was a horizontal extrapolation in play 
based on the fear that the UK could signal the partial or full collapse of the 
Eurozone. This fear led to uncertainty in the integrated financial market of 
the EU, and in particular the Eurozone as many member nations were 
growing disincentivised with the whole EU integrative process (e.g. Italy, 
France and Holland). The prolonged and complicated process of Brexit is 
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partly down to the fact that the EU does not want togive too many 
concessions to the UK, in the process illustrating that life outside the EU 
could be worth considering. 
 
6. Conclusion 
In summarising, this research used the theory of European integration to 
review how the European Union reacted to three different episodes in the 
lifetime of the euro. Furthermore, to give depth to the empirical section, we 
used behavioural finance theories in explaining the reaction of the market 
participants in the euro FX market. We analysed the reactions in the market 
over the short and long runs using the variance bound test of (Fakhry & 
Richter, 2018).   
We found that the market was volatile in the short-run, this is to ve 
expected; since as indicated by (Pastor & Stambaugh, 2012), conventional 
wisdom dictates that the short run is volatile. However, we also found that 
the long run was highly volatile during both the euro crises and populist 
movements episodes which do not conform to the conventional wisdom. 
On closer analysis, the behaviour of the market participants does suggest a 
feedback effect between the market participants and the EU. Moreover, 
since these two episodes were reflecting questionsabout the very existence 
of the euro, especiallythe populist movement episode; hence, they were 
mirroring the genuine fear in the FX market. 
In concluding, it is hard to overestimate the feedback effect on the 
reactions of both the market participants and the EU during the euro crises 
and populist movements episodes. The lack of a uniformed plan and 
miscommunication from the EU and member states did impact the market 
in the long run. However, as put elegantly by John Maynard Keynes: 
 
“The long run is a misleading guide to current affairs. In the long run, weare all 
dead.” 
 
What we mean is that the EU concentrated too much over the long-run; 
it partially neglected the problems in the short run. Issues like the loss of a 
national identity and economic issues, which the populist political parties 
managed to turn into mass politics. However, another crucial factor is the 
weaknesses in the EMU at the time of conceptualisation as hinted by 
Romano Prodi: 
 
“I am sure the euro will oblige us to introduce a new set of economic policy 
instruments. It is politically impossible to propose that now. But someday there 
will be a crisis and new instruments will be created.” 
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